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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELIZABE'TH JtONES, 
Plaintiff -Appellant, 
vs. 
HORMAN'S, INC., a Utah 
corporation, ALLEN BT'EEL 
COM'PANY, a Utah corporation, 
JOHN DOE, and 
RICHARD ROE, 
Defendants-Respondents 
Case No. 9956 
BRIEF OF DEFE'NDANT-RESPONDENT 
ALLEN S'TE'EL COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF 'THE NATU~RE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries. 
DfSPOSITION IN LOWER CO'URT 
The Lower Court granted a Summary J udg-
ment in favor of the Defendant..:Resporrdents, Hor-
man's, Inc. and Allen Steel Company. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendant, Allen Steel Company, wants 
the Judgment of the Lower Court affirmed. 
STATEMEN·T OF MATERIA:L FACTS 
The Plaintiff-Appellant's Statement of Facts 
may be misleading to this court. 
The Defendant-Respondent, Allen Steel Com-
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pany, moved for a Summary Judgment in its favor 
based on the pleadings and depositions of the plain-
tiff and the plaintiff's husband, Julius Jones (R. 
31). The order of the court granting Summary 
Judgment in favor of each defendant ('R. 4'2) shows 
the court read the depositions of plaintiff and plain-
tiff's husband. The court was furnished the defend-
ant, Allen Steel Company's copy of the depositions, 
and no place in the record is it shown that counsel 
for the Plaintiff-Appellant requested that the ori-
ginals be published and read. Orally at the hearing 
on fue Motion for 'Summary Judgment and in the 
Plaintiff-Appellant's reply to the Memoranda of 
each Defendant-Respondent, the plaintiff admitted 
the truth of the facts stated in the 'Memoranda of 
eacJ:t Defendant-Respondent (R. 64). 
The defendant, Horman's, Inc., is a general 
contracting 'Company which w.as engaged in build-
ing an .addition to the Towne House Athletic Club, 
at 158 South Third East, Salt Lake City, on March 
2'7, 196'2. 'The Defendant-Re'Spondent, Allen 'Steel 
Company, was the steel company which was engaged 
in fabricating and erection of steel a:s a subcon-
tractor at the job site. (R. 57). Horman's, Inc. was 
the general cont~actor with the owner Towne House 
Athletic Club, and Allen Steel Company was the 
subcontractor with Horman's Inc. (R. 5'7'). 
'The plaintiff, Elizabeth Jones, is the wife of 
Julius Earl Jones. On March 2'7, 19'6'2 Julius Earl 
Jones visited a Mr. Hoffine, the masonry subcon-
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tractor under Horman's, Inc. at another job site 
at Albertson's Market at 3rd South and 4th East 
and inquired from Mr. Hoffine about receiving em-
ployment, and was allegedly ·told that as soon as 
the steel was up on the Towne House job, Mr. Hof-
fine would prdbably he able to use Mr. Jones on 
that project. 
Mr. Julius Jones, the husband of the pla:intiff, 
did not talk to any employee of Allen Steel Oompany 
prior to going on the job site, and never talked to 
any employee of Horman's, Inc. before going on the 
job site. 
On March 27, 1'962 Mr. Jones ·observed beams 
being unloaded from a truck at the Towne House 
site, and on the evening of the accident after all 
work was shut down (R. 58) at about 7:30 P.M. 
when no workmen were upon the jo'b site, and the 
only persons present upon the job site were the 
plaintiff and the plaintiff's husband, they went upon 
the property. 
At this time the beams were laying east to 
west in the bottom ·of a ramp which ran up from the 
basement of •the Towne House to the west. 'The steel 
beams were long enough so that the west end of 
each beam stuck out of the end of the ramp and 
above the surface of the ground, and it w.as in 'the 
area west of the ramp where the plaintiff was 
seated by her husband on a cinderblock ( R. 58). 
While the plaintiff was on the Towne House 
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Athletic property, the steel beams tipped over, and 
allegedly the plaintiff was injured. 
This accident happened at 7:30 P.M. March 
2'7, 1962 on a construction site when no work was 
in progress. The accident happened at dusk in the 
daylight. 
In the complaint (R. 1) the plaintiff did not 
allege that she was .a business visitor or invitee 
upon the premises. At the Pretrial ( R. 3'5) the 
court gave the plaintiff five days to file a State-
ment of Facts, and the entree order on May 8, 1963 
fails 'to show (R. 35) that plaintiff w.as ever given 
permission to file the Amended Complaint which 
constitutes R. 36 of the Record. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE PLAINTIFF WAS 
NOT AN INVITE'E. 
1The nature of use "to which land and prdperty 
is put is often sufficient to express to the reason-
able understanding of the public or classes or mem-
bers thereof the willingness of a person to be re-
ceived as an invitee or 'business visitor. 
Is it customary for prospective workmen to 
take their wives to job sites after progress on the 
construction has shut down for the day? Was any 
econom'ic benefit bestowed upon the Defendant- Re-
spondent, Allen Steel Company by the plaintiff go-
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ing on the project at 7:30P.M. after work had ceased 
at the construction job site? 
The plaintiff admits that neither Horman's, 
Inc. nor Allen Steel Company nor any of their em-
ployees invited her to enter or remain upon the 
land (R. 59). Further, (R. 60) it is admitted that 
this accident occurred after project hours at a con-
~truction job site at a time when the defendant had 
no knowledge of the plaintiff's presence or oppor-
tunity to consen't or object to her presence. 
Prosser on Torts, Second Edition, page 4'52 de-
fines an invitee as follows: 
"An invitee is a pers·on who is invited 
to enter or remain on land for the purpose of 
the occupier. Some courts require that the 
business upon which she comes be pecuniary 
in nature, or of some economic benefi't to the 
possessor; others require only that it be such 
that there is an implied representation, that 
care ·has been exercised to make the land safe 
for the visitor. 
'~The possessor is required to exercise 
reasonable care to warn the invitee, or to make 
the premises safe for him, as to dangerous 
conditions or activities of which the possessor 
knows or those which he should discover with 
reasonable care. The obligation exists only 
while the visitor is upon the part of ·the pre-
mises to which his invitation extends." 
The Allen Steel Company had no interest, econ-
omic or otherwise, in performance of the masonry 
"-ork on this project. The masonry work was some-
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thing to be done on the premises after the steel erec-
tion was completed by Allen Steel Oompany, and 
Allen Steel Company employees had left the pre-
mises. 
What authority did the masonry contractor 
have to invite the plaintiff's husband upon the pre-
mises- when the premises were not even ready for 
him . to perform his subcontract work? 
'The Restatement of Torts, Section 33·2, defines 
business visitor as follows: 
''A business visitor is a person who is 
invited or permitted to enter or remain on l'and 
in the possession 'Of another for a purpose 
directly or indirectly connected with the busi-
ness dealings between them." 
Under Com'ment H, Section '3'3'2, Restatement 
of Torts, the following comment is made: 
'·'A person may be a business visitor of 
the lessor of land although he is merely a gra-
tuitous licensee of the lessee. 'Thus, a lessor 
of an appartment in an apartment house or 
an office in an office building, who retains 
the control of the halls, stairways, and other 
approaches to the apartment or office has a 
business interest in the use of these facilities 
by any person whom his lessee may choose 
to admit, irrespective of whether the visit of 
such a person is for his own or the lessee's 
business purpose, or whether he comes as a 
mere social guest or other gratuitous licensee 
of the tenant." 
Obviously, the fact that Mr. Jones could have 
been an invitee df Mr. Hoffine in going on the pre-
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mises does not prove that he was an invitee or that 
his wife was an invitee of the Allen Steel Company. 
The case of Hayward vs. Downing, (1948) 112 
Utah 508, 189 P. 2d 442 is of no assistance to the 
plaintiff, as in that case certain ticket holders from 
Bountiful, Utah were given permission to watch a 
fight from a platform and they admittedly paid for 
this privilege, and then during the course of the 
progress of the fight the platform collapsed and they 
were injured. Obviously, that case is different from 
this case in that they paid the price and were given 
a direct invitation and permission to use the p1at-
form. 
In Mills vs. H eidingsfield (1'9139) -La. App. ____ , 
1912 S. 786 where a plaintiff went on a porch at a 
house for the purpose of inquiring as to future 
vacancy of the residence, and it was not disclosed 
the premises had ever been advertised for occupancy, 
it was held as a matter of la:w the plaintiff was a 
mere licensee. 
In Mortgage Commission Servicing Corp. vs. 
Brock, (19'39) 60 Ga. App. 619·5, 4 S.E. 2d 669, where 
a realtor advertised in a Sunday newspaper giving 
the number and location of an apartment which was 
for rent and where the plaintiff visited the apart-
ment unaccompanied by the realtor and without 
previously communicating to the realtor, the ad-
vertisement was held to not constitute an implied 
invitation, and plaintiff was held not to be an in-
vitee. 
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In Amerioan Ry. Express Co. vs. Gilbreath, 
C1931) 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, 48 F. 2d 809, 
where the plaintiff, a la;borer, entered a storage 
building and fell into an unguarded elevator shaft 
after a man in the front office building said, "Go 
back and see him," it was held there was no appar-
ent authority to give an invitation to the plaintiff 
and that he was not an invitee. 
What apparent authority did Mr. Hoffine have 
to invite prospective masonry employees on this 
project when he was not even working at the job 
site? 
In Gowen vs. Davis (1963) ____ Ida. ____ 377 P. 
2d 950, where the ·plaintiff, a bystander watching 
a truck being loaded wi~th a balled evergreen shrub 
observed the front end of the truck go off the ground, 
as the lo1ad was put in the rear, !and voluntarily 
climbed onto a fender to assist 'in holding the front 
o'f the truck down, and thereafter was injured when 
the truck sprung up, the plain tiff was held as to 
the persons loading the truck to be a licensee only. 
In Eddy vs. John J. Brady Pklstering Company 
(1961) 1'11 Ohio App. 190, 1'71 N.E. 2d 7;2'2, where 
a heating subcontractor's employee, who was using 
a plastoring sc'affold, conferred n~o !benefit or mu-
tual advantage upon the plastering subcontractor, 
the em·ployee was held to be a mere licensee, and 
the scaffold owner did not owe such employee a 
duty of reasonable care to see that the scaffold was 
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safely constructed, and the plastering subcontractor 
was held not liable for the injury suffered by the 
employee of the heating subcontractor when the scaf-
fold collapsed as the employee was attempting to 
move it for his own use in carrying out his own 
work. 
In Dishingham vs. A. W. Kuettel and Sons, Inc. 
(1959) 255 Minn. 3'25, 9'6 N.W. 2d 6'84, where a 
hospital engineer was ordered 'by his superintendent 
to read the hosp1ital steam condensate meters located 
in a sub~basemen t df a new wing under construc-
tion, and where it was shown that in the area where 
the plaintiff was injured the premises were under 
the control of the metal su!bcorrtrtactor and that there 
was no economic benefit, mutual or otherwise, it 
was held that the plaintiff, when he entered to read 
such meters, was neither a ''''business visitor" nor an 
"invitee" but a mere gratuitous licensee. 
In Brauner vs. Leutz (194'3) 29'3 Ky. 406, 169 
S.W. 2d 4, a case which is sometimes indicated as 
being the leading case with some text writers, where 
an independent painting contractor, to prime a corn-
ice, was granted consent of an independent carpen-
ter ·contractor to occupy a scaffold constructed by 
the carpenter to put on the cornice, and when while 
doing so, the scaffold collapsed, the court held that 
the status of the parties was licensor-licensee and 
not master and servant or invitor and invitee, not-
withstanding the custom for independent contract-
ors to appropriate others equipment and facilities 
on the scene of the building construction, as there 
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was no invitation or economic benefit bestowed on 
the ·carpenter contractor by the painting contractor. 
In Michigan in Munson vs. Vane-Stecker Com-
pany, · ('t9157) 79 N.W. 2d 855, 347 Mich. 377, the 
court said in determining whether a steel contractor 
using a scaffold of another contractor was a licensee 
or an invitee, the test is whether there existed a mu-
tual interest and mutual advantage to the parties 
concerned for the use of equipment belonging to one 
party and used by another. 
In a Federal case in Dillingham vs. Nick Doug-
las Company, (19159) 2'61 Fed. 2d 26'7, where the 
court granted a pre-emptory instruction in favor 
of the defendant independent contractor, it was 
said that where the independent contractor's em-
ployee was injured in a fall from a scaffold which 
was defective because of a knot in a cross timber 
which was part of a warehouse which was utilized 
by the employee for the support of a scaffold during 
the installation of a sprinkler system, that the em-
ployee was a mere licensee on the cross timber and 
that the owner's responsibility was only to alert 
the employee o'f any peril positively known to them. 
In Arthur vs. StJandard Engineering Company, 
(19'51) 1'93 Fed. '2d 903, 89 U.S. App. D.C. 399, 
312 A.L.R. 2d 408, where the electrical subcontract-
or's employee sued steam fitting subcontractor for 
injuries sus~a'ined when steam fitting subcontractor's 
scaffolding broke while plaintiff was upon it, the 
trial court was affirmed in holding that as a matter 
of 1a w the plaintiff was a licensee and not an in vi tee. 
10 
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Further in A'rthur vs. Standard Engineering Com-
pa.ny, supra., the court said that even though the 
general custom existed whereby scaffolds and lad-
ders were built by one subcontractor and were used 
by employees of other subcontractors, that custom 
did not make the employee of the electrical subcon-
tractor an invitee of the steam fitting subcontractor, 
as evidence showed as a matter of law steam fitting 
subcontractor had no interest and derived 1 no fin-
ancial 'benefit or advantage of any work done by 
the electrical contractor and there was no mutual 
benefit in having employees of the electrical sub-
contractor use the scaffolds. 
No where in the appellant's brief does 'the ap-
pellant say what financial, economic advantage, mu-
tual or otherwise, the Allen Steel Company derived 
from having the plaintiff's husband go upon the job 
site. 
It may have been of some mutual interest and 
financial advantage to Horman's, Inc. to have the 
masonry contractor obtain employees to do the ma-
sonry subcontract work, but since this work was not 
to be done until the steel er~tion was completed, it 
is equally obvious there was no mutual business 
interest or advantage to Allen Steel Company 'to have 
the masonry con tractor or any of his employees or 
any prospective employees of the masonry contractor 
upon the job site prior to the completion of the 
erection. 
Even if it should be decided or assumed for the 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
sake of argument that Mr. Julius Jones was an in-
vitee, there is no reason why the plaintiff should 
enjoy the same status. 
Is it the custom for women to accompany their 
husbands to construction job sites? Further, is it 
the custom for women to vi,sit with prospective em-
ployees job sites where their husbands are looking 
for work, particularly after work has ceased for 
the day( 
1The cases which plaintiff cites in support of 
her contention that she was an 1invitee are hardly 
in point. In Brigman vs. Fiske-Garter Construction 
Company (19'2'6) 1'9'2 N.C. 791, 136 S.E. 12'5, 49 
A.-L~R. 773 where the plaintiff went upon the pre-
mises of the defendall!t company with her husband 
who had been expressly invited to come upon the 
premises to seek employment and where she was 
injured while sitting in a car parked in the parking 
lot, the court us-ed language to· indicate that she was 
an implied invitee. IThe Brigman case, supra., in-
volves active and not passive negligence. In regard 
to- active negligence, a possessor of land is subject 
to liability to both licensees and business visitors. 
In Section 341, Restatement of Torts, the rule is 
stated as follows : 
''A possessor of land is subject to liability 
to licensees, whether business visitors or gra-
tuitous licensees, for bodily harm caused to 
them by his failing to carry on his activities 
with reasonable care for their safety, unless 
the licensees knows or from facts known to 
12 
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them, should know the possessors activities 
and of the risk involved fuerein." 
In the Brigman case, supra., the wife was sit-
ting in the husband's car while it was parked in 
the parking lot where he had been invited to leave 
it, and the defendant actively backed a truck into 
the car injuring the plaintiff and damaging the 
car. The difference and the distinguishing point be-
tween the Brigman case, supra., and this case is 
that the Brigman case involved active negligence, 
and this case involves passive negligence only. 
'The case of Fortune vs. Southern Railroad Com-
pany ('1909) '1'50 N.C. 695, 64 S.E. 7519 would not ap-
pear to be in point and is easily distinguishable. Ob-
viously, there is an implied invitation to go down 
and meet the train or go out to the .airport and 
meet the plane, and persons using terminal facili-
ties to meet passengers are true invitees. But at 
what construction site is it customary for the wife 
to go and look over the status of the work or the 
progress of the job after working hours? Is there 
any economic benefit bestowed upon Allen Steel 
Company by having the plaintiff in 1fuis case visit 
the job site prior to the time the plaintiff's pros-
pective employer begins his work and at a time when 
no workmen were present? 
Kalus vs. Bass (1916) 12·2 Md. 4·6'7, 89 Atl. 
731 is hardly in point. In this case a husband was 
invited by express invitation to inspect some rooms 
for possible tenancy and took with him his son who 
13 
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was going to be a joint tenant of the premises, and 
while visiting the premises a stairway collapsed. 
Obviously, since the premises had to please the mem-
bers of the family as wen as the father, there was 
an implied invitation for an of the family to in-
spect them. What man doesn't take his family or 
older children with him when looking for a house, 
but how often, if ever before, have we ever heard of 
a prospective workman taking his wife to a pros-
pective job site? 
It does not seem that the right to enter the 
premises during working hours for an inspection 
gives any consent or right to go on the premises 
after work for the day has ceased. If Mr. Jones had 
any right to go on the premises to inspect the status 
of the work in progress, it would appear that he 
should have exercised that right while workmen 
were upon the job and before the closing hour. Fur-
ther, it would seem that as a reasonable man, he 
had no need to enter any portion of the premises, 
as from the sidewalk or the street, it would have 
been obvious the steel beams were not in pltace and 
that masonry construction was not about to start 
immediately, and that there was no reasonable ex-
cuse on his part for going on the premises to view 
the status of obviously incomplete steel erection. 
In New Jersey in Liveright vs. Max Lijsitz 
Furniture Company, (19136) 117 N.J. 24'3, 187, Atl. 
5'83 the owner of a furniture store was held not 
' liable to a furniture salesman for injuries received 
14 
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by the salesman when the salesman attempted to 
enter an unlighted toilet after having used the furni-
ture store's ~telephone for his own personal telephone 
call, and where the toilet was not open for the pub-
lic, and where there was no suggestion that the toilet 
was maintained for 1fue accommodation of store 
customers. In other words if you go on a part of 
the premises where you wouldn't reasonably be ex-
pected, it relieves your status of an invitee and 
you become a licensee merely. 
-In Massachusetts in McNamarra vs. MacLean 
(19'39) 302 Mass. 4'2'8, 19 N.E. 2d 544 where the 
plaintiff received permission to use a toilet but was 
told that this toilet was only for the use of the em-
ployees, and where 'it was difficult to enter because 
of a trap door, and where the pl'aintiff was in'jured 
when she fell from a stairway below the trap door, 
she was held to be an invitee in tfue store, but a li-
censee only in using the stairway going down from 
the trap door to the toilet. 
Bird vs. Cloverleaf-Harris Dairy ( 194'2) 102 
Utah 330, 125 P. '2d '79'7, is 'in my opinion the con-
tl·olling case. In this case where Montell Bird, son 
of the plaintiff, and a milk tester employed by 
Federated Milk Producers, parked his father's auto-
mobile under a canopy in front of the garage doors 
at the Cloverleaf-Harris Dairy when he knew that 
a regular parking lot was provided for the use of 
customers and employees in parking illieir cars, and 
where the son thought the garage would not be used 
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during the time his father's car was left at thlat 
location, and where other employees parked beneath 
the canopy but did not block the entran~e to the 
garage, and where the canopy feU on 1fu.e plaintiff's 
car, and where the court assumed that canopies 
did not fall in the aJbsenfCe of negligence, and t}liat 
negligence existed, this court said the plaintiff could 
not re'cover as the liability of the owner extended 
no further than the ivi tation and that the plaintiff 
was a licensee only. In Bird vs. Cloverleaf-Harris 
Dairy, supra., the court sa:id it would not be ordin-
ary and customary to park so as to block 'the en-
trance to the garage, and as such, in parking in that 
location, the plaintiff was a licensee. Further, the 
court said in Bird vs. Clov,erleaf-Harris Dairy, su-
pra., the only duty owed to a licensee was not to will-
fully or wantonly damage the licensee's property. 
I submit the Bird case, supra., is in point, and 
that it would not be ordinary and customary to take 
your wife to a Job site at '7 :30 'P.M. after work has 
ceased any more than it would be to park your 
father's car in an area not designated for public 
parking. 
In summary it is submitted the plaintiff is not 
an invitee for the following reasons: 
1. The plaintiff was not on a part of the pre-
mises Where it would be ordinary and customary 
to expect her. 
2. 'The plaintiff was not on the premises at 
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3. 
a time when it would be ordinary and customary 
to expect here. 
3. She entered a job site where construction 
was in progress. 
I. 
4. She had had no implied or apparent 'invita-
tion to enter the job site. 
d.. 
5. There was no reason for the plaintiff's 
husband to go on the job site when he could observe 
from the street the steel had not been erected and 
the proje·ct was not ready for masonry work to pro-
~e~ . 
6. No economic benefit was bestowed upon the J/-
Allen Steel Company by the entry of the plaintiff 
or the plaintiff's husband on the job site. 
7. There was no 'business relationship of any 
nature between the plaintiff's husband and the de-
fendant, Allen Steel Company. ~ Q'I/\;C-l"' -\ 
It is submitted that as a matter of law all rea-
sonable men would agree under the existing facts 
illle plaintiff was a mere licensee·· only. 
POI'NT II. 
ALLEN STEEL COMfPANY owgn NO DUTY TO 
l\IAKE TffiS JOB SITE SAFE FOR THE PLAINTIFF. 
While generally a possessor of land is required 
to exercise reasonable care to warn the invitee, or 
to make the premises safe for him as to dangerous 
condi·tions or activities o'f which the possessor knows, 
or those which he could discover with reasonable 
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care, this is not an absolute rule, and if the general 
obligation exists, it exists only while the visitor is 
upon a part of the prem'ises to Which his invitation 
extends. Sometimes it is said that an invitee going 
on a construction job site accepts the premises in 
their then existing condition and has no right to 
require the possessor to modify, change, or other-
wise prepare the premises for their entry. 
In H elvich vs. Rutherford Company · ('t95'3) 
96 Ohio App. '367, 1114 N.E. '2d 514, we have an in-
dication of what duty is owed to anyone on a con-
struction job site. In Helvich vh. Rutherford Com-
pany, supra., where the watchman entered the leased 
premises while work was shut down during the 
course of construction on a Saturday afternoon to 
lead the plumber to a water leak, ~and fell from a bal-
cony without a railing which had been removed to 
facilitate construction in progress, the court said: 
"*- * * when a property is under construction, 
there are, of necessity, hazards created as the 
work progr~sses which are only eliminated 
by its completion. Anybody who goes upon 
such property with knowledge of it under 
construction must meet with and guard him-
self against such natural and necessarily cre-
ated dangers. A contractor is not compelled 
in the exercise df ordinary care to guard 
against such natural dangers after the work 
of the day is over and the property is closed 
for ordinary purposes to business visitors, 
licensees, or frequentors." 
In California in Coggins vs. Hanchette (19'59) 
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---· Cal. ____ , 338 P. 2d 379, Where a lady telephone 
~upervisor employed by the Pacific Telephone and 
Telegraph Company fell on some m'astic in a hall 
area in fue telephone building placed in the hall 
by an independent con tractor's employee, the court 
said that the plaintiff was an inv!tee of the tile 
contflactor, but the jury returned a verdict on be-
half of the defendant, and the California Supreme 
Court affirmed the following instruction : 
"You are instructed that an invitee coming 
upon the premises in the process of construc-
tion is invited to use the prem'ises in their then 
condition. Put in another way the invitation 
is merely to use the premises in whatever 
condition fuey are at the time of entry." 
In Boucher vs. Amerioan Bridge Company, 
(1950) 9'5 Cal. App. ·2'1, 659, '21'3 P. 2d 5'37, where 
an employee of an electrical contractor brought an 
action against American Bridge, an independent 
contractor for steel erection, the court said ,a;s to 
the owners, both the electrical contractor and the 
steel contractor were invitees, and as to each other 
they were strangers between whom there was no 
privity or contract, and as such, they owed to the 
employees of each such other the same duty of ex-
ercising ordinary care for their safety during pro-
gress of work as they owed to the public generally. 
In other words, they owed no obligaltion 'to make the 
job site safe for entry of each other's employees, 
but would be liable for active negligence in injury-
ing eaCh other's employees. 
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R·estatemerrt of 'Torts, Section 3'42 ~provides 
as follows: 
''A possessor of land is subject to liability for 
bodily harm caused to gratuitous licensees by 
a natural or artificial condition thereof if 
but only if, he: ' 
(.a) knows of the condition and realizes 
that it involves an unreasonable risk 
to them and 'has reason to beHeve that 
they· will not discover the condition 
or realize the risk, and 
(b) invites or permits them to enter or 
remain upon the land, without exer-
cising reasonable care 
( i) 'to make the condition reasonably 
safe, or 
( ii) to warn them of the conditions 
and the risk involved." 
Our court approved of the foregoing Section 
of the Restatement of Torts and adopted the S'ame 
ruling in Wood vs. Wood, 8 Utah 2d 21719, 33'3 P. 2d 
630 ( 1915'9). 
In this case the admitted statement ~of facts 
and depositions show that the Allen Steel Company 
did not know of the condition involved and that it 
did not 'invite or permit the plaintiff to remain upon 
the land after discovering the condition and the risk 
involved. 
In fact, the evidence in the record is conclusive 
to the fact that the dangerous condition was never 
discovered by the defendant, Allen Steel Company, 
or any of its employees. 
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POINT Ill. 
W~NTON MISCONDU,CT W ~S NOT AN ISSUE 
PRESENTED IN THE LOWE'R COURT .A:ND SHOULD 
NOT BE CONSIDEREn BY THIS COURT. 
'The plaintiff's Com~plaint does not allege will-
ful or wanton misconduct ( R. 1). 'The Amended 
Complaint which the plaintiff filed (R. 36) did not 
allege any wanton or willful misconduct. 
Not 'having alleged wanton misconduct or wan-
ton conduct on the part of the Allen 'Steel Company, 
it would appear that ·the Allen 'Steel Company had 
no reason to deny wanton conduct, and certainly the 
plaintiff has no reason ~o complain because the 
court did not consider a theory not considered by the 
plaintiff in the plaintiff's Complaint or Amended 
Complaint. In Tyges.en vs. Magna Water Company 
(1962) 13 Utah 2d 39'7, '3'7'5 P. 2d 41516, this court 
held that a puint may not he raised for the first 
time on appeal. 
In any event what occurred here w.as not will-
ful misconduct. In Milligan vs. Harward ( 1960), 
where an action was brought against the driver 
after he lost control of nis car while reaching for 
a cigarette, this court defined willful misconduct, 
and in Milligan vs. Harward, supra., said: 
"Harward's act in reaching for the cigar-
ette cannot be construed as willful miscon-
duct. Willful misconduct is 'the intentional 
doing of an act or intentionally omitting or 
failing to do an act, with knowledge that 
serious injury is a probable and not merely 
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a possibl~ result, or the intention~,! doing of 
an act with wanton and reckless dis,regard of 
the possible consequences. Willful misconduct 
cannot he predica:ted upon the mere inadver-
tence or even gross negligence." 
Certainly, since 'Allen Steel ·Company did not 
know of the danger of the beams falling over and 
did not know of the plaintiff's presence on the pre-
miges after working hours, and had no reason in 
the exercise of due care 'to expect that she would 
go on the premises, and become injured, there is ana 
was no willful miscondu~t under the facts of this 
case. 
'POINT IV. 
AS A MA'TTER OF LAW THE ALLEN STEE'L 
COMPA!NY DrD NOT KNOW OF A 'DANGEROUS CON-
DITION ON 'THE PR'EMIJ'SES, AND 'HAD NO 'REASON 
TO 'BELIEVE THE ICONU'ITION, 'EVEN IiF KNOWN, 
WOUJ.JD INVOLVE AN UNRE·ASONABL'E RISK TO 
THE PIJA]N'TTFF. 
'The plaintiff-appellant admits Allen Steel Com-
pany did not, directly ·or impliedly, invite Julius 
Jones 1to enter the premises, ( R. S7, R. 58, 'and R. 
64) . 'This plaintiff went on the premises With her 
husband at 7 :'30 P.M. in the ·evening after work on 
the project had closed for the day and when no work-
men were present. Neither she nor her husband 
had sought the permission of Allen Steel Company 
to enter the pre:mises, and 'there was no reason for 
the plaintiff or her husband to enter the premises, 
as a visual inspection of the work in progress would 
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show that the steel erection had not been completed 
and tha:t masonry work was not about to start. 
In Wood vs. Wood, ( 1'95'9) 8 U·tah 2d '279, 333 
P. 2d 630, where the plaintiff visited her daughter-
in-law's home to pick up some wedding invitations 
and ·entered the House through a garage door and 
fell down a darkened stairwell tHa1t she had tempor-
arily forgotten a;bout, our ~court said the duty owed 
to 'a license was limited to refrain from willfu1ly 
injuring and from perm'i tting conditions to exist 
which might be considered a 'trap, and that a guest 
cannot heedlessly enter into darkness in an unknown 
area and then complain of the danger encountered. 
In Tempest vs. Richa~dson ( 1'915'6) 5 Utah 2d 
174, 29'9 P. 2d 124, where the pl1aintiff entered the 
defendant's home as an invited guest and was un-
familiar with its construction, and wher·e while go-
ing to the bathroom opened a door and entered a 
darkened area without first ascertaining whether 
it was safe to do so, and where she fell down a 
stairway in ~he darkened .area, it was he~d that the 
host was not liable. 
Further, it would appear that if an invited 
social guest or member of the family who has an 
implied invitation 'to enter cannot recover, that there 
is no duty owed to a woman who enters a construc-
ti'On job site where she is unfamiliar with conditions, 
and that Mrs. Jones who heedles8ly and thought-
lessly entered the cons1truction area, can now not 
complain of fue dangers she encountered. 
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It is submitted that if Mrs. Jones has any right 
to complain, the owner and possessor of property is 
a guarantor of the safety of anyone entering with-
out the owner or possessor's consent, and that as 
long as a person goes on propel'lty without giving 
the owner or possessor a chance to object, the owner 
or possessor will be liable. Manifestly, a burden of 
this type should not be impressed upon the owner 
or possessor. 
CON'CLUSION 
'The judgment of illle Lower Court should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAYMOND M. BERRY 
Attorney for 
Defendant-Respondent 
Allen Steel Company 
203 Executive Building 
45'5 East Fourth 'South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
I her~by certify that on this ---------------- day of 
September, 1963, I mailed two copies of this Brief 
by United States mail, postage prepaid, to John E. 
Stone and Robert C. Cummings, and two copies to 
Ray, Quinney, and Nebeker and Stephen B. Nebeker 
at the addresses shown on this Brief. 
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